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Abstract. This article describes the basic findings of and some phenomenological concerns with social
judgment and decision-making research applied to developing support for security policies.
Social judgment research has long reinforced the notion that--in general-- humans are more aversive to
loss than they are desirous of comparable gain. Applied to the international security of a nation-state,
the notion suggests that it is much more effective to generate political support by phrasing a policy
option in terms of the negatives that will allegedly occur if the option is not followed, not the positives
that will occur if the option is followed. Policymakers and their political helpers should, then, take
appropriate note in jousting within the arena of public opinion about national ballistic missile defense
systems, humanitarian interventions in faraway lands, fighter aircraft, and so on. As a hypothetical
example, without a missile defense, the probability of thousands of United States (US) citizens dying in a
North Korean nuclear attack will increase ten-fold. Or without humanitarian intervention in the nationstates of Southern Africa, the probability of millions of US citizens dying from out-of-control pandemics
will increase five-fold. Or without fielding hundreds of F-22 tactical fighters, the probability of many US
military forces dying through the loss of air superiority in battle will approach certainty.
However, generating and maintaining support for policy options in the so-called real, political world may
well involve a more complex or at least different concatenation of social psychological processes than
those identified through common research studies via the experimental laboratory, polling formats on
the future, and retrospective archival analyses of real-world cases. Part of this complexity and difference
stem from research disparities with natural political phenomena and often comprise the degree of
participant involvement and perception of degree of policy impact on valued attitudes and behaviors.
A more important source of complexity and difference stems from the disparity between the
researcher's abstractions of loss and gain and the research subject's corresponding phenomenologies.
Quite simply, individuals may differ in how they cognitively, motivationally, and emotionally process
consequential statements. For some, a statement about the positive consequences of supporting a
policy option becomes one about the negative consequences of not supporting that option in a virtually
effortless manner. The converse applies as well. This positive becoming the negative, the negative the
positive--loss as gain and gain as loss--may occur once, several, or many times, in sequential, distributed,
asynchronous, and/or parallel fashions, to varying degrees of consciousness and impact on external
behaviors. As well, different policy options may differ further as to the ease with which each can be
perceived and processed as generating positive consequences through implementation or negative
consequences through rejection. Finally, the historical and socio-cultural contexts of specific security
Issues, also may sully the waters of a clear case for human risk aversion and/or approach towards gain.
Political psychologists and other social scientists need to continue to delineate the parameters linking
research on social judgment and decision-making with support for security and other political policies. In
doing so, they should be careful to avoid the risky model of the rational, logical human and to embrace
gains from one that also encompasses incomplete self-knowledge, the irrational, and the illogical. (See
Jervis, R. (1992). Political implications of loss aversion. Political Psychology, 13, 187-204; Kleinhesselink,
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R. R., & Rosa, E. A. (1991). Cognitive representation of risk perceptions: A comparison of Japan and the
United States. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 22, 11-28; Nurius, P.S. (2000). Risk perception for
acquaintance sexual aggression: A social-cognitive perspective. Aggression & Violent Behavior, 5, 63-78;
Peterson, S. A., & Lawson, R. (1989). Risky business: Prospect theory and politics. Political Psychology,
10, 325-339; Shafir, E. (1992). Prospect theory and political analysis: A psychological perspective.
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(Keywords: Risk Aversion, Security Policy.)

2
https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp/vol9/iss6/2

2

